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Abstract
In this paper, the optimal pricing strategy in Avellande-Stoikov’s [1] for a monopolistic
dealer is extended to a general situation where multiple dealers are present in a competitive
market. The dealers’ trading intensities, their optimal bid and ask prices and therefore their
spreads are derived when the dealers are informed the severity of the competition. The
effects of various parameters on the bid-ask quotes and profits of the dealers in a competitive
market are also discussed. This study gives some insights on the average spread, profit of
the dealers in a competitive trading environment.
1 Introduction
The role of a dealer in securities markets is to stand ready immediately to trade fixed amounts
of securities at stated bid and ask prices. An investor who would like to trade immediately (a
demander of immediacy) can do so by placing a market order to trade at the best available price:
the bid price if selling or the ask price if buying. Liquidity provision was once performed only
by dedicated broker-dealers, known as market makers. Market makers kept enough liquidity in
their hands so as to satisfy both supply and demand of any arriving traders. In recent years,
with the growth of electronic exchanges such as Nasdaq’s Inet, anyone wishing to submit limit
orders in the system can easily play the role of a dealer. Agents who can post limit orders based
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on the availability of high frequency data, form a competitive trading environment. In this
paper, we focus on studying the optimal pricing strategies under multiple dealers’ competition.
The pricing strategies of dealers have been studied extensively in the micro-structure litera-
ture. The two most often addressed sources of risk faced by dealers are: (1) the inventory risk
arising from uncertainty in the asset’s value; and (2) the asymmetric information risk arising
from informed trades. As noted by Demsetz (1968) [6], while the limit orders are in a queue,
the dealer who places limit orders incurs both inventory and waiting costs. Inventory costs arise
from uncertainty about market prices of the securities that the dealer may hold in his portfo-
lio while his limit orders are pending. The waiting costs are the opportunity costs associated
with the time between placing an order and its execution. The concept of transaction costs
was first proposed by Demsetz [6]. Copeland and Galai (1983) [4] pointed out in their paper
that limit orders also suffer from an informational disadvantage, whereby they are picked off by
better-informed investors.
Generally speaking, the probability of limit orders being executed depends on the limit order
price proximity to the current market price. Cohen et al. (1981) [5], called this phenomenon a
“gravitational pull” of existing quotes. Limit orders placed at current market quotes are likely
to be executed, whereas the probability of execution for aggressive limit orders is close to zero.
They also pointed out that the probability of executing a limit order decreases as a security’s
order arrival rate decreases.
Stoll (1978) [21] developed an explicit and rigorous model for an individual dealer limited
to the behavior of a single dealer making a market in a single stock. They also discussed the
implications of trading cost in different market organizations of dealers. Ho and Stoll (1981) [13]
extended Stoll’s (1978) work in the aspect of uncertainty (introduction of transactions uncer-
tainty), explicit treatment of a multi-period strategy for the dealer, and also the introduction of
the demand side. For the supply side, the research work was pioneered by Demsetz (1968) [6],
and additional theoretical contributions were made by Tinic (1972) [22] and Stoll (1978) [21].
Garman (1976) [8] was the first to investigate the optimal market-making conditions through
modeling temporary imbalances between buy and sell orders. Ho and Stoll (1981) [13] adopted
Garman’s concept of stochastic supply and demand for securities, viewing both the demand to
sell and buy securities as demand for dealer services and assuming a linear demand relation for
dealer sales and purchases. They took the “true” price of the stock to be exogenously determined
by an information set, and assumed that the dealer’ prices were relative to the “true” price. The
key concern of Ho and Stoll is about the risk that the dealer faces, and how this affected dealer’s
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willingness to provide his services. In another paper by Ho and Stoll (1980) [12], the problem
of dealers under competition was analyzed and the bid and ask prices were shown to be related
to the reservation (or indifference) prices of the agents.
Based on the idea and work of Ho and Stoll (1981) [13], Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008)
[1] enhanced Garman’s model to a quantitative market-making limit order book strategy that
generates persistent positive returns; indeed the economic setting of the problem is similar.
The main differences are the nature of “true” price of the asset, the explicit utility function of
the agent and the trading intensity under the laws governing the micro-structure of financial
markets. In [1], the “true” price was given by the market mid-price. In order to model the
arrival rate of buy and sell orders that will reach the agent, they drew on recent results in
econophysics 1, Potters and Bouchaud (2003) [20], and gave an exponential arrival rate of the
market orders. The approach adopted is to combine the utility framework of the Ho and Stoll
(1981) [13] approach with the micro-structure of actual limit order book as described in the
econophysics literature. The strategy, focusing on the effects of inventory risk, outperforms the
“best-bid-best-ask” market-making strategy where the trader posts limit orders at the best bid
and ask available on the market.
More recently, Cartea and Jaimungal [3] used a similar model to introduce risk measures
for high-frequency trading. They used a model inspired by Avellaneda-Stoikov [1] in which the
mid-price is modeled by a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Guilbaud and Pham [11] also used
a model inspired by the Avellaneda-Stoikov framework but including market orders and limit
orders the best (and next to the best) bid and ask together with stochastic spreads. Gue´ant
et al. [10] provided some simple and easy-to-compute expressions for the optimal quotes when
the trader is willing to liquidate a portfolio. Some other recent works include Alavi Fard (2014)
[23] and Song et al. (2012) [24] for example. It seems that in the literature more attention has
been given to trading strategies in a single dealer’s framework while relatively little attention
has been paid to a multiple-dealer case. We are dedicated to the latter case.
In this paper, the dealers’ optimal bid and ask quotes in the multiple dealers case are de-
termined. The optimal pricing strategy accounts for two key factors: the inventory level of the
the dealer and the competition severity. Our paper contributes to the high frequency trading
literature in various aspects. Firstly, we derive the optimal bid and ask prices for each dealer
when the dealers are informed the severity of the competition (for example,how many active
dealers are in the market). Each dealer quotes his optimal prices considering the market infor-
1Econophysics is an inter-disciplinary research area, which applies theories and methods in Physics to study
Economics problems.
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mation and his own inventory level to maximize his final profit at terminal time T . Secondly, we
compare quoting prices with those obtained in [1] to shed some lights on trading competition in
the market. Thirdly, we also conduct comparison of the profit generated by dealers in compet-
itive markets with that in single dealer markets. This comparison may hopefully enhance our
understanding on how high frequency trading dealers gain profits by providing stock liquidity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, to give readers the
background of research, we review two models, one by Ho and Stoll in [13] and the other by
Avellaneda and Stoilov in [1]. In Section 3, we present the extended model and results in
[1] for a market consisting of N dealers. The limit order book intensities for the dealers are
derived. In Section 4, we consider two situations, inactive dealers and active dealers, for the
multiple dealer problem. In the case of dealers in markets under competition, we need to make
use of an approximation method and the principle of Dynamic Programming (DP), i.e., the
solution methods combine backward induction with a forward simulation of states. In Section 5,
numerical results are given and compared for one-dealer and multiple-dealer situations. Finally,
concluding remarks are given in Section 6 to discuss further research issues.
2 A Review of Two Models
In this section, we describe the background of this research by reviewing two related models,
one by Ho and Stoll in [13] and the other by Avellaneda and Stoilov in [1]. The developments
below follow those in [1, 13].
2.1 Ho-Stoll Model
The model proposed by Ho and Stoll (1981) [13] imposed the following assumptions.
(i) Transactions are assumed to evolve over time according to Poisson jump processes as in
Garman (1976) [8]. Two Poisson processes are used, one for purchases by the dealer and
the other for sales by the dealer, as follows:
dqa = X{an arrival of a market buy order}Qλadt
and
dqb = X{an arrival of a market sale order}Qλbdt
where XE is the indicator function of the event E, Q is the market order size, and λa
and λb are the intensities of the transactions. Here dqa and dqb are the increments of the
number of market buy orders and the number of market sale orders, respectively.
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(ii) The dealer determines a price of immediacy, b, should a market sale order arrive and a
price, a, should a market buy order arrive. The dealer does not directly quote b and a,
instead, he quotes his bid and ask prices, respectively, as follows:
pb = p− b and pa = p+ a.
Here p is the dealer’s opinion of the true price of the stock at the time he sets the bid-ask
quotation and this price is supposed to be a given constant.
(iii) The intensities, λa and λb, depend on the dealer’s selling fee and buying fee, respectively.
(iv) In addition to uncertainty about the timing of subsequent transactions, the dealer faces
uncertainty about the return on his existing portfolio. Consequently

dF = rFdt− (p − b)dqb + (p+ a)dqa
dI = rIIdt+ pdqb − pdqa + IdZI
dY = rY Y dt+ Y dZY .
Here F, I, Y are the balances of the cash account, inventory account, and base wealth,
respectively. Here rI , rY represent the mean return of inventory account and base wealth
per unit time, respectively. And r is the constant continuously compounded risk-free rate.
Here ZI and ZY are Wiener processes with mean zero and constant variance rates, σ
2
I and
σ2Y , respectively.
The objective of the dealer is to maximize the expected utility of his total wealth, Et[U(WT )],
at the terminal time T , where
WT = FT + IT + YT .
Notice that Et[U(WT )] is the conditional expectation of U(WT ) given information up to time t.
Numerous transactions and price changes occur between t and T .
2.2 Avellaneda-Stoikov Model
Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) [1] modified the model of Ho and Stoll (1981) [13] in some aspects.
(i) Assume that the money market pays no interest, and the mid-market price, or mid-price,
of the stock evolves over time according to the following zero-drift diffusion process:
dSu = σdWu (1)
where the initial value St = s, {Wu}t≤u≤T is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion
and σ is a constant, i.e., a constant volatility model.
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(ii) The agent’s objective is to maximize the expected exponential utility of his portfolio at
the terminal time T . The exponential utility is given by
u(w) = − exp(−γw) (2)
where γ is the risk-aversion parameter.
(iii) The Poisson intensity at which the agent’s orders are executed is supposed to be exponen-
tial. In the symmetric case, exponential arrival rates are assumed to take the following
form:
λ(δ) = Ae−kδ (3)
(iv) The reservation bid and ask prices rb(s, q, t) and ra(s, q, t), which can be interpreted as
the indifference prices for buying and selling, respectively, are introduced and they satisfy
 v(x− r
b(s, q, t), s, q + 1, t) = v(x, s, q, t)
v(x+ ra(s, q, t), s, q − 1, t) = v(x, s, q, t)
(4)
where v(x, s, q, t) = Et[U(WT )], x is the initial wealth at time t and q is the initial inventory
level at time t.
In their model, it is assumed that there is only one monopolistic dealer in the trading system.
The dealer buys or sells one stock in the market. The dealer quotes the bid price pb and the ask
price pa, and is committed to, respectively, buy and sell one share of stock at these prices. The
wealth in cash Xt jumps whenever there is a buy order or sell order and it is governed by
dXt = p
adNat − pbdN bt . (5)
Here N bt is the amount of stocks bought by the dealer and N
a
t is the amount of stocks sold. They
are assumed to follow Poisson processes with intensities λb and λa, respectively. The number of
units of the stock or the inventory level held by the dealer is then governed by
dqt = dN
b
t − dNat . (6)
The objective of the dealer who can set limit orders is
u(s, x, q, t) = max
δa,δb
Et [− exp(−γ(XT + qTST ))] (7)
where δa = pa−s, δb = s−pb and the dealer holds q stocks at time t. Note that δa and δb are the
prices of immediacy for selling and buying, respectively, from the dealer’s perspective. For the
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case of an inactive trader, the choice variables δa and δb are absent. According to Avellaneda
and Stoikov (2008) [1], the value function for the inactive dealer, who holds an inventory of q
stocks until the terminal time T , can be written as follows:
u(x, s, q, t) = − exp(γx) exp(−γqs) exp
(
γ2q2σ2(T − t)
2
)
. (8)
The definition of reservation or indifference price was introduced in [1] and we shall give it in
Eq. (11). The dealer’s reservation bid and ask prices rb and ra are given, respectively, by
 u(x− r
b(s, q, t), s, q + 1, t) = u(x, s, q, t)
u(x+ ra(s, q, t), s, q − 1, t) = u(x, s, q, t)
(9)
i.e., 
 r
b(s, q, t) = s+ (−1− 2q)γσ2(T−t)2
ra(s, q, t) = s+ (1− 2q)γσ2(T−t)2 .
(10)
Hence the average of the above two prices, say the reservation price or the indifference price, is
given by
r(s, q, t) = s− γqσ2(T − t). (11)
To consider the case of active dealers, who will make decisions to buy or sell before the terminal
time T , in [1], the authors derived the following HJB equation (see for instance [1], Section 3):

∂u
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2u
∂s2
+max
δb
λb
[
u(s, x− s+ δb, q + 1, t)− u(s, x, q, t)
]
+max
δa
λa [u(s, x+ s+ δa, q − 1, t) − u(s, x, q, t)] = 0
u(s, x, q, T ) = − exp(−γ(x+ qs)).
(12)
To solve the HJB equation, in [1], the authors consider the simplest case by assuming that the
Poisson intensities take the following form (c.f. Eq. (3)):
λb(δ) = λa(δ) = Ae−kδ. (13)
Then the following trial solution was adopted:
u(s, x, q, t) = − exp(−γx) exp(−γθ(s, q, t)) (14)
where θ(s, q, t) is approximated up to the second-order of a Taylor expansion about the inventory
variable q:
θ(s, q, t) = θ(0)(s, t) + θ(1)(s, t)q + θ(2)(s, t)q2 + . . .+ . (15)
7
When the inventory level is q, the reservation bid price of the stock and the reservation ask price
of the stock are given, respectively, by
 r
b(s, q, t) = θ(s, q + 1, t)− θ(s, q, t)
ra(s, q, t) = θ(s, q, t)− θ(s, q − 1, t).
(16)
Substituting θ into Eq. (12) yields

θt +
1
2σ
2θss − 12σ2γθ2s +max
δb
(
λb(δb)
γ
(1− eγ(s−δb−rb)
)
+max
δa
(
λa(δa)
γ
(1− e−γ(s+δa−ra)
)
= 0
θ(s, q, T ) = qs.
(17)
Using the first-order optimality condition, the problem can be transformed into the following
one: 

θt +
1
2σ
2θss − 12σ2γθ2s + Ak+γ
(
e−kδ
a
+ e−kδ
b
)
= 0
θ(s, q, T ) = qs.
(18)
In [1], the authors consider an asymptotic expansion of θ about q, and higher order terms are
assumed to be small enough to be negligible. By considering the coefficients of q and q2, the
following results are obtained:
r(s, t) = s− qγσ2(T − t) (19)
which matches with Eq. (11) and the bid-ask spread is then given by
δb + δa = γσ2(T − t) + 2
γ
ln
(
1 +
γ
k
)
. (20)
3 The Limit Order Book Rates
In this section, we consider the situation of multiple dealers in a competitive market. We focus
on the discussion of dealers’ trading rates in the market.
In [1], for only one dealer in the market, the arrival rates of buy and sell orders that will
reach the dealer follows a Poisson process with a common exponential arrival rate in Eq. (13)
which depends on dealer’s quotes. In the case of multiple dealers market under competition, we
assume that the overall frequency of market orders will depend on the quotes of all dealers in
the market. Suppose that there are N dealers in the market and that dealers have impacts on
the arrival of market orders. Under certain assumptions, we shall show that the market orders
follow a Poisson process with common exponential arrival rate,
λa(δ1, · · · , δN ) = λb(δ1, · · · , δN ) = Ae−k(β1δ1+···+βNδN ).
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Here βi reflects the influence (e.g. competitiveness) of Dealer i on the overall frequency of market
orders. In a number of studies [1, 2, 7, 9, 19], it has been shown that the distances δai , δ
b
i (c.f.
Eq. (7)) and the current shape of the limit order book determine the priority of execution when
large market orders get executed. For example, when a large market order to buy Q stocks
arrives, the Q limit orders with the lowest ask prices will be automatically executed. Let pQ
be the price of the highest limit order executed in this trade, we define ∆p = pQ − s to be the
temporary market impact of the trade of size Q. If the agent’s limit order is within the range
of this market order, i.e. δai < ∆p, his limit order will be executed. To quantify dealers’ trading
intensity, other than the overall frequency of market orders, we need to know the distribution
of market orders’ size and the temporary impact of a large market order. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that dealers’ impacts on the overall frequency of market orders, i.e.,
λa(δa1 , . . . , δ
a
N ) and λ
b(δb1, . . . , δ
b
N ) are “separable” and have an “identical functional form”, i.e.,
(we take λa as an example), taking the following form:
λa(δa1 , · · · , δaN ) = f1(δa1)f2(δa2 ) · · · fN (δaN ).
and fi(δ
a
i ) = f(δ
a
i )
βi. Here βi describes Dealer i’s impact on market orders’ overall frequency.
Then
λa(δa1 , . . . , δ
a
N ) = Ae
−k(β1δa1+···+βNδ
a
N
).
Furthermore, if the distribution of the size of market orders Q obeys a “power law”, [7, 9, 19],
i.e., fQ(x) ∝ x−1−α and the market impact follows a “log law” [2], i.e., ∆p ∝ ln(Q), then we
have
λai = Ae
−k(β1δa1+···+βN δ
a
N
)e−(1−
1
N
)βiδai .
The proof of the proposition can be found in Appendix A.
4 The Multiple-Dealer Problem
In this section, we discuss the situation of multiple dealers buying and selling stocks in a com-
petitive market. In particular, we consider two situations: inactive and active dealers. The
underlying problem is a state-feedback control problem. Both inactive dealer’s “frozen” strategy
and active dealer’s optimal quoting strategy are discussed in this section. For the active dealer’s
situation, each dealer follows a multi-period strategy that maximizes his objective function tak-
ing into account not only his own possible future actions but also those of his competitors. This
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is much more complex than the single dealer case. Discrete and continuous models for active
dealers are discussed. Furthermore, a comparison between the performances of active dealers
and inactive dealers is made.
Our objective is to study the trading strategies of different dealers in a competitive market,
where each dealer has his own reservation value of the stock based on his inventory position. The
dealers wish to buy or sell stocks in the market, and the mid-price is assumed to be governed
by the following stochastic differential equation (c.f. Eq. (1)): dSu = σdWu with initial value
St = s. Here {Wu} is a standard Brownian motion and σ is a positive constant. Each dealer i,
(i = 1, 2, . . . , N), quotes his bid price pbi(u) and ask price p
a
i (u), and is committed to, respectively,
buying and selling one share of the stock at these prices at time u. Hence, the wealth of Dealer
i in cash Xi(u) jumps whenever there is a buy or sell order executed.
dXi(u) = p
a
i (u)dN
a
i (u)− pbi(u)dN bi (u) (21)
where N bi (u) is the amount of stocks bought and N
a
i (u) is the amount of stocks sold by Dealer
i up to time u. They are supposed to follow Poisson processes with intensities, λbi and λ
a
i ,
respectively. In view of the results in Proposition 1, the Poisson intensities take the form:
 λ
a
i = Ae
−k(β1δa1+···+βN δ
a
N
)e−βi(1−
1
N
)δai
λbi = Ae
−k(β1δb1+···+βNδ
b
N )e−βi(1−
1
N
)δbi .
(22)
The number of stocks is governed by
dqi(u) = dN
b
i (u)− dNai (u). (23)
Let
δai (u) = p
a
i (u)− Su and δbi (u) = Su − pbi(u) (24)
then we have
d(Xi(u) + qi(u)Su) = dXi(u) + Sudqi(u) + qi(u)dSu
= pai (u)dN
a
i (u)− pbi(u)dN bi (u) + Su(dN bi (u)− dNai (u)) + qi(u)σdWu
= δai (u)dN
a
i (u) + δ
b
i (u)dN
b
i (u) + qi(u)σdWu.
(25)
4.1 Inactive Dealer
We first consider an inactive trader, Dealer i, who does not have any limit orders in the market
and simply holds an inventory of qi stocks until the terminal time T , which is a special case
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of the feedback control problem in which (δai , δ
b
i ) = (∞,∞). Following [1], it is not difficult to
show that
ui(s, xi, qi, t) = − exp(−γixi) exp(−γiqis) exp
(
γ2i q
2
i σ
2(T − t)
2
)
(26)
which is the same as the value function calculated in the monopolistic market, showing us
directly its dependence on the market parameters. The reservation bid and ask prices are given
implicitly by the relations
 vi(s, xi − r
b
i (s, qi, t), qi + 1, t) = vi(s, xi, qi, t)
vi(s, xi + r
a
i (s, qi, t), qi − 1, t) = vi(s, xi, qi, t)
(27)
which means that the agent is indifferent between keeping inactive and buying one stock at the
reservation bid price rbi (or, selling one stock at the reservation ask price r
a
i ). It is straightforward
to calculate that 
 r
b
i (s, qi, t) = s− (1 + 2qi)γiσ
2(T−t)
2
rai (s, qi, t) = s+ (1− 2qi)γiσ
2(T−t)
2
(28)
and the reservation (or difference) price is given by
ri(s, qi, t) =
rai (s, qi, t) + r
b
i (s, qi, t)
2
= s− qiγiσ2(T − t). (29)
4.2 The Active Dealers
In general, it may not be easy to determine the optimal quoting strategies for dealers in a
competitive market. In the market, each dealer’s action depends not only on his own but also his
competitor’s characteristics. They all need to solve a relatively complex Dynamic Programming
(DP) problem than the one encountered in the single dealer case. In this section, we develop a
feasible quoting policy using a linear approximation method and the principle of DP. We first
discuss a discrete model and then give a recursive formula for the bid and ask quotes. We then
extend the discrete model to a continuous one. By directly using a linear approximation and the
DP principle to solve the optimal control problem, one can obtain an optimal quoting strategy
for dealers in the continuous competition model.
4.2.1 The One-period Model
Suppose there are N dealers in the market, namely Dealer 1, Dealer 2, . . ., Dealer N . In the
one period case, we assume that dealers may only trade in the last trading session, (tn−1, tn)
and trades happen immediately after time tn−1. Dealers choose their bid and ask quotes at
the beginning of the trading session, tn−1, defined through the controls (δ
i,b
n−1, δ
i,a
n−1)
N
i=1. These
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quotes influence the arrival rates of market orders over the time interval (tn−1,, tn). By Eq. (22),
the arrival rates take the following forms:
 λ
i,a
n−1 = Ae
−k(β1δ
1,a
n−1+···+βNδ
N,a
n−1)e−(1−
1
N
)βiδ
i,a
n−1
λi,bn−1 = Ae
−k(β1δ
1,b
n−1+···+βNδ
N,b
n−1)e−(1−
1
N
)βiδ
i,b
n−1 .
(30)
For any dealer in this competitive market, the objective is to determine the optimal bid and ask
quotes to maximize his own expected utility function:
V i(sn−1, x
i
n−1, γ1, · · · , γN , q1n−1, · · · , qNn−1, tn−1) = max
δ
i,a
n−1,δ
i,b
n−1
{
E
[− exp(−γi (XiT + qiTST ))|Fn−1]}
(31)
which is a stochastic feedback control problem. For any dealer, he can only determines his
optimal bid and ask quotes δi,bn−1 and δ
i,a
n−1. However, the stochastic feedback problem is related
to optimal bid and ask quotes δ1,bn−1, · · · , δN,bn−1 and δ1,an−1, · · · , δN,an−1 of all dealers. Thus it is also a
problem of game competition, especially, it is a simultaneous game problem. Suppose all dealers
achieve the Nash equilibrium in this game problem, then the results in the proposition below
follow.
Proposition 2 The optimal quoting policy in the one period case is

δi,an−1 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−1)
2
(−2qin−1 + 1)
δi,bn−1 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−1)
2
(2qin−1 + 1)
(32)
and Dealer i’s utility is given by
V i(sn−1, x
i
n−1, γ1, · · · , γN , q1n−1, · · · , qNn−1, tn−1)
= − exp (−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1)
2(T − tn−1)
2
)
[
1− γi∆tn−1
(k+1− 1
N
)βi+γi
(
λi,an−1 + λ
i,b
n−1
)] (33)
where ∆tn−1 = tn − tn−1.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
We remark that
(i) Only in the one-period case, a dealer’s bid and ask quotes are independent of his competitors.
However, even in the one-period case, the value function of each dealer is not independent
of the inventory position and other parameters, such as risk aversion of the competing
dealers.
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(ii) Dealer i’s bid-ask spread is given by
δi,bn−1 + δ
i,a
n−1 =
2
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+ γiσ
2(T − tn−1) (34)
which is independent of the inventory. After taking a first-order approximation of the
order arrival term, we have
λi,an−1 + λ
i,b
n−1 = A

2− (k + 1− 1
N
)βi(δ
i,a
n−1 + δ
i,b
n−1)− k
∑
j 6=i
βj(δ
j,a
n−1 + δ
j,b
n−1) + · · ·+


(35)
where the linear term does not depend on the inventory variables. Therefore, if we sub-
stitute Eq. (35) into Eq. (33), we arrive at the conclusion that Dealer i’s utility depends
only on his own inventory qin−1. We define this approximation as
f i(sn−1, x
i
n−1, q
i
n−1, γ1, · · · , γN , tn−1)
which equals
− exp (−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1)
2(T − tn−1)
2
)
hin−1 (36)
where
hin−1 = 1−
Aγi∆tn−1
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi + γi
{
2− (k + 1− 1
N
)βi
[ 2
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+ γiσ
2(T − tn−1)
]
− k
∑
j 6=i
βj
[ 2
γi
ln
(
1 +
γj
(k + 1− 1
N
)βj
)
+ γjσ
2(T − tn−1)
]}
.
(37)
(iii) Set
f i(sn−1, x
i
n−1, q
i
n−1, γ1, · · · , γN , tn−1) = − exp
(−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1)) gin−1(qin−1, tn−1)
where
gin−1(q
i
n−1, tn−1) = exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1)
2(T − tn−1)
2
)
hin−1
is independent of stock price sn−1 and cash wealth x
i
n−1.
(iv) We define the market bid and ask quotes,
δbn−1 = min{δi,bn−1, i = 1, 2, . . . , N} and δan−1 = min{δi,an−1, i = 1, 2, . . . , N}
and the market bid-ask spread,
sn−1 = δ
b
n−1 + δ
a
n−1
which depends on dealers’ inventories. We remark that Dealer i’s bid-ask spread is always
positive, however, the market bid-ask spread can be negative.
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(v) Notice that
V i(sn−1, x
i
n−1, γ1, · · · , γN , q1n−1, · · · , qNn−1, tn−1)
= − exp (−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1)
2(T − tn−1)
2
)
[
1− γi∆tn−1
(k+1− 1
N
)βi+γi
(
λi,an−1 + λ
i,b
n−1
)]
> − exp (−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1)
2(T − tn−1)
2
)
which means that active dealers will always have advantage over the inactive dealers.
In the next section, we shall employ this linear approximation technique to analyze the
dynamics of dealer markets in the multi-period case.
4.2.2 The Two-period Model
Assume that Dealer i may only trade in the intervals (tn−2, tn−1) and (tn−1, tn). The dealer
chooses bid and ask quotes at time tn−2 and tn−1 with the controls δ
i,b
n−2, δ
i,a
n−2, δ
i,b
n−1 and δ
i,a
n−1, and
trades happen immediately after time tn−2 and tn−1. Adopting the above linear approximation,
one can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In two period model, dealers’ optimal bid and ask quotes are given by

δi,bn−2 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−2)
2
(2qin−2 + 1)
δi,an−2 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−2)
2
(−2qin−2 + 1)
(38)
and Dealer i’s utility is given by
V i
(
sn−2, x
i
n−2, γ1, · · · , γN , q1n−2, · · · , qNn−2, tn−2
)
= − exp(−γi(xin−2 + qin−2sn−2)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2)
2(T − tn−2)
2
)
[
1− γi∆tn−2
(k+1− 1
N
)βi
(
λi,an−2 + λ
i,b
n−2
)]
hin−1
(39)
where ∆tn−2 = tn−1 − tn−2.
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
We remark that
(i) The spread (compare to Eq. (34))
δi,bn−2 + δ
i,a
n−2 =
2
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+ γiσ
2(T − tn−2)
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is independent of the inventory. By taking a first-order approximation of the order arrival
term, we have (compare to Eq. (35))
λi,bn−2 + λ
i,a
n−2 = A

2− (k + 1− 1
N
)βi(δ
i,a
n−2 + δ
i,b
n−2)− k
∑
j 6=i
βj(δ
j,a
n−2 + δ
j,b
n−2) + · · ·+

 .
(40)
We notice that the linear term does not depend on the inventory. Similar to the one-period
case, substituting the linear approximation of λi,bn−2 + λ
i,a
n−2 into Eq. (38), one can get an
approximation of Dealer i’s utility f i(sn−2, q
i
n−2, x
i
n−2, γ1, · · · , γN , tn−2), which equals to
− exp(−γi(xin−2 + qin−2sn−2)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2)
2(T − tn−2)
2
)
hin−2h
i
n−1 (41)
and it only depends on his own inventory.
(ii) Set
f i(sn−2, x
i
n−2, q
i
n−2, γ1, · · · , γN , tn−2) = − exp
(−γi(xin−2 + qin−2sn−2)) gin−2(qin−2, tn−2)
where
gin−2(q
i
n−2, tn−2) = exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2)
2(T − tn−2)
2
)
hin−2h
i
n−1
is independent of stock price sn−2 and cash wealth x
i
n−2.
By repeating the argument of this analysis, one can get the following result for the multi-
period model.
4.2.3 The Multi-period Model
Suppose that there are at most N trades occur in [t, T ]. Divide the time period into n + 1
small subintervals, (t0 = t, t1), · · · , (tn−1, tn), (tn, T ). Assume that each trade may only occur
immediately after the beginning of those subintervals and there is no trade occurring in (tn, T ).
All dealers choose their bid and ask quotes at time tl (l = 0, 1, . . . , n−1), defined by the controls
δi,bl and δ
i,a
l . Adopting the approximation of dealers’ utility functions and using the back-forward
analysis method, it is straightforward to obtain the following proposition and we skip the proof.
Proposition 4 In the n-period model, dealers’ optimal bid and ask quotes are given by

δi,bl =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tl)
2
(2qil + 1)
δi,al =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tl)
2
(−2qil + 1)
(42)
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and Dealer i’s utility is given by
V i
(
sl, x
i
l , γ1, · · · , γN , q1l , · · · , qNl , tn−2
)
= − exp(−γi(xil + qilsl)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qil)
2(T − tl)
2
)
[
1− γi∆tl
(k+1− 1
N
)βi
(
λi,al + λ
i,b
l
)]∏n−1
m=l+1 h
i
m
(43)
where ∆tl = tl+1 − tl.
4.2.4 The Continuous Model
In every step of the back-forward model, we adopt the first-order approximation of the arrival
terms appearing in the utility function. Then we find that an approximate dealer’s utility
functions depend only on their own inventories. We then consider the case of continuous model.
Define the approximate utility as ui(s, xi, qi, t). The following theorem results from applying the
principle of Dynamic Programming (DP).
Theorem 1 The optimal bid and ask quotes in dealer markets under competition are given by

δi,bt =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − t)
2
(2qi + 1)
δi,at =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − t)
2
(−2qi + 1)
(44)
and dealers’ approximate utility functions under the quoting strategy are greater than those for
the inactive case; that is,
ui(s, xi, qi, t) > − exp(−γi(xi + qis)) exp
(
γ2i q
2
i σ
2(T − t)
2
)
. (45)
Proof: We note that
ui(s, xi, qi, t) = max
δai ,δ
b
i
Et[− exp(−γi(XiT + qiTST ))]
which is derived when the dealer follows the optimal strategy for setting δbi and δ
a
i at each
point in time period [t, T ]. To simplify our discussion, we suppose that other dealers are in
equilibrium under the Cournot competitive environment [15]. The Cournot competition model
is an economic setting for describing a market where firms compete on their amount of output
and make decisions independently of each other.
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Using the principle of Dynamic Programming (DP) and under certain smoothness conditions
of the value function ui,the following HJB equation is obtained.

∂ui
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2ui
∂s2
+max
δbi
λbi [ui(s, xi − s+ δbi , qi + 1, t)− ui(s, xi, qi, t)]
+max
δai
λai [ui(s, xi + s+ δ
a
i , qi − 1, t) − ui(s, xi, qi, t)] = 0
ui(s, xi, qi, T ) = − exp(−γi(xi + qis)).
(46)
As in [1], the following ansatz is considered
ui(s, xi, qi, t) = − exp(−γixi) exp(−γiθi(s, qi, t))
where θi(s, qi, t) is an approximate quadratic polynomial in the inventory variable qi. Then the
HJB equation can be written as follows:

θit +
1
2
σ2θiss −
σ2γi(θ
i
s)
2
2
+ max
δbi
{
λbi (δ
b
1, · · · , δbN )
γi
(
1− exp(γi(s− δbi − rbi )
)}
+max
δai
{
λai (δ
a
1 , · · · , δaN )
γi
(
1− exp(−γi(s+ δai − rai )
)}
= 0
θi(s, qi, T ) = qis.
(47)
From the first-order optimality condition in Eq. (47), we can obtain the optimal distance δai
and δbi of Dealer i given the equilibrium values of all dealers, which satisfy

s− rbi (s, qi, t) = δbi −
1
γi
ln

1− γiλbi
∂
∂δbi
λbi(δ
b
1, · · · , δbN )


rai (s, qi, t)− s = δai −
1
γi
ln
(
1− γiλ
a
i
∂
∂δai
λai (δ
a
1 , · · · , δaN )
) (48)
where 
 r
b
i (s, qi, t) = θ
i(s, qi, t)− θi(s, qi − 1, t)
rai (s, qi, t) = θ
i(s, qi + 1, t) − θi(s, qi, t).
(49)
The above is the best response function of Dealer i given the values of other dealers’ quotes.
In Nash equilibrium, all dealers will play the best responses. Thus we can solve the above N
equations simultaneously to obtain the optimal feedback controls δa1 , · · · , δaN and δb1, · · · , δbN . We
recall that
λai = Ae
−k(β1δa1+β2δ
a
2
+···+βNδ
a
N )e−βi(1−
1
N
)δai .
Thus we have
∂λai
∂δai
= −
(
k + 1− 1
N
)
βiλ
a
i (50)
and similarly,
∂λbi
∂δbi
= −
(
k + 1− 1
N
)
βiλ
b
i . (51)
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Substituting the optimal values given by Eq. (48) into Eq. (47) and using the rate of limit order
book in Proposition 1, we obtain

θit +
1
2
σ2θiss −
σ2γi(θ
i
s)
2
2
+
λai + λ
b
i(
k + 1− 1
N
)
βi + γi
= 0
θi(s, qi, T ) = qis.
(52)
We consider an asymptotic expansion of θi(s, qi, t) in the inventory variable qi
θi(s, qi, t) = θ
i,(0)(s, t) + θi,(1)(s, t)qi + θ
i,(2)q2i + · · ·+ . (53)
From the exact relations of the indifference bid and ask prices, rbi and r
a
i , we obtain
 r
a
i (s, qi, t) = θ
i,(1)(s, t) + (2qi − 1)θi,(2)(s, t) + . . .+
rbi (s, qi, t) = θ
i,(1)(s, t) + (2qi + 1)θ
i,(2)(s, t) + . . .+ .
(54)
Recall the first-order optimality conditions

s− rbi (s, qi, t) = δbi −
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
rai (s, qi, t)− s = δai −
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
) (55)
and we have
δbi + δ
a
i = −2θi,(2)(s, t) +
2
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
(56)
which does not depend on the inventory qi. Taking a first-order approximation of the order
arrival term
λbi + λ
a
i = A

2− (k + 1− 1
N
)βi(δ
a
i + δ
b
i )− k
∑
j 6=i
βj(δ
a
j + δ
b
j) + · · ·+

 (57)
we notice that the linear term does not depend on qi. Since
θi(s, 0, t) = θi,(0) and ui(s, xi, 0, t) = g(x)
then θi,(0) = 0. Therefore, by grouping the terms of order qi, we obtain
 θ
i,(1)
t +
1
2σ
2θ
i,(1)
ss = 0
θi,(1)(s, T ) = s
(58)
whose solution is θi,(1)(s, t) = s. Grouping terms of order q2i yields
 θ
i,(2)
t +
1
2σ
2θ
i,(2)
ss − 12σ2γi(θ
i,(1)
s )2 = 0
θi,(2)(s, T ) = 0
(59)
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whose solution is
θi,(2)(s, t) = −1
2
σ2γi(T − t). (60)
We obtain almost the same value function for an active agent as for an inactive agent,
ui(s, xi, qi, t) ≈ − exp(−γixi) exp(−γiqis) exp
(
γ2i q
2
i σ
2(T − t)
2
)
and the same indifference price
ri(s, qi, t) = s− qiγiσ2(T − t).
Now we analyze the difference between our approximation and the exact solution of our HJB
equation. Suppose that
θi(s, qi, t) = w
qi(t) + sqi − 1
2
σ2γi(T − t)q2i (61)
where (wqi)qi∈N is a family of continuous functions. Substituting the above expression directly
into the HJB equation, we obtain 
 w
qi
t + g
qi(t) = 0
wqi(T ) = 0
(62)
where (gqi(t))qi∈N is a family of positive functions. Consequently,
wqi(t) =
∫ T
t
gqi(u)du
which is always greater than zero for t < T . Thus we have
θi(s, qi, t) > sqi − 1
2
σ2γi(T − t)q2i
i.e.,
ui(s, xi, qi, t) > − exp(−γi(xi + qis)) exp
(
γ2i q
2
i σ
2(T − t)
2
)
. (63)
Now we set the bid-ask spread as
δai + δ
b
i = γiσ
2(T − t) + 2
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
(64)
and a price adjustment as
mi = δ
a
i − δbi = rai + rbi − 2s = 2ri − 2s = −2qiγiσ2(T − t). (65)
We remark that
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(i) For the “frozen inventory” problem, we have

Et[xi + qiST ] = xi + qis
ui(s, xi, qi, t) = − exp(−γixi) exp(−γiqis) exp
(
γ2i q
2
i σ
2(T−t)
2
)
.
For the active dealer, we have

Et[Xi(T ) + qi(T )ST ] = xi + qis+ Et
[∫ T
t
δai dN
a
i +
∫ T
t
δbidN
b
i
]
> xi + qis
ui(s, xi, qi, t) > − exp(−γixi) exp(−γiqis) exp
(
γ2i q
2
i σ
2(T−t)
2
)
.
This means that active dealers using our strategy to quoting always have an advantage
over inactive dealers.
(ii) When N = 1, then βi = 1,
δbi + δ
a
i = γiσ
2(T − t) + 2
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
k
)
which coincides with the results in Avellanede and Stoikov (2008) [1].
(iii) The price adjustment mi = −2qiγiσ2(T − t), depends on the dealer’s inventory. It is
an inventory response equation that specifies the price adjustments variable be negative
(positive) when inventory is positive (negative). When mi < 0, both bid price and ask
price are “low”, in this situation, the dealer prefers to sell than to purchase, and this will
therefore reduce the dealer’s inventory. On the other hand, ifmi > 0, then the dealer prefer
to purchase than to sell. The degree of price response to an inventory change depends on
the same factors determining the size of the bid and ask spread-time remained (T − t),
Dealer i’s risk aversion (determined by γi) and variance (determined by σ);
(iv) Compared with the “frozen inventory strategy”, our strategy can eventually improve
dealer’s final profit which is no less than the original indifference curve (in the “frozen
inventory” problem, (δai , δ
b
i ) can be seen as (+∞,+∞)).
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we present and discuss numerical results on both single monopolistic dealer and
multiple dealers in a competitive market.
5.1 Bid-ask Quotes
Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) tested the performance of their “inventory” strategy, focusing
primarily on the shape of the P&L profile and the final inventory qT . They compared it with a
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benchmark strategy that is symmetric around the mid-price, regardless of the inventory under
the assumption of a monopolistic dealer. In this section, we test the performance of our strategy
for multiple dealers in a competitive stock market.
Suppose that there are N dealers in a market. In the numerical experiments, we assume βi’s
to be identical, i.e., βi = 1/N . As far as our simulation is concerned, we chose the following
parameters: s = 100, t = 0, T = 1, σ = 2, dt = 0.005, qi = 0, γi = 0.1, k = 1.5 and A = 140,
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N (the values of the parameters are chosen to be the same as those in [1]).
The simulation results are obtained through the following procedures:
(i) At time t, the agents’ quotes, δbi and δ
a
i for Dealer i, (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) are computed, given
the state variables;
(ii) At time t + dt, the state variables are updated: with probability λai (δ
a
i )dt, Dealer i’s
inventory decreases by one and his wealth increases by s + δai ; with probability λ
b
i(δ
b
i )dt,
Dealer i’s inventory variable increases by one and the wealth decreases by s − δbi , where
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The mid-price is updated by a random increment ±σ√dt.
Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively, present the optimal bid-ask quotes and their profits of
the monopolistic dealer and competitive dealers (two dealers). The profit of each dealer in the
two-dealer case is approximately half of that in the monopolistic case. This seems consistent
with the assumption that βi = 0.5, (i = 1, 2), equal sharing of the profits. Avellaneda-Stoikov’s
inventory strategy generates persistent positive returns while our extended strategy preserves
this good property in a competitive market.
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Figure 1: The mid-price and the optimal bid-ask quotes of one monopolistic dealer.
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Figure 2: The mid-price and the optimal bid-ask quotes of two dealers.
5.2 Competitive Dealers and Their Profits
We consider the effects of changing from one monopolistic dealer to multiple dealers in a compet-
itive market where the number of dealers varies. The numerical results are presented in Tables
1-4 and also Figures 3 and 4.
Table 1: 1000 simulations of one dealer with γ = 0.1 and β1 = 1.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1.49 64.26 5.68 0.20 3.40
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Table 2: 1000 simulations of two dealers with γ1 = γ2 = 0.1 and β1 = β2 = 0.5.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1 2.11 29.15 6.09 -0.02 2.88
Dealer 2 2.11 29.40 6.22 0.08 2.79
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
 
 
dealer−1 profit
dealer−2 profit
Figure 3: γ1 = γ2 = 0.1 and β1 = β2 = 0.5.
Table 3: 1000 simulations of three dealers with γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0.1 and β1 = β2 = β3 = 1/3.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1 2.79 15.69 5.65 0.14 2.51
Dealer 2 2.79 15.85 5.69 -0.11 2.58
Dealer 3 2.79 15.88 5.53 -0.01 2.44
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Figure 4: γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0.1 and β1 = β2 = β = 1/3.
Table 4: 1000 simulations of seven dealers with γi = 0.1 and βi = 1/7.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1 5.40 1.76 2.34 0.028 0.79
Dealer 2 5.40 1.93 2.52 -0.045 0.84
Dealer 3 5.40 1.95 2.57 0.003 0.82
Dealer 4 5.40 1.79 2.46 -0.03 0.80
Dealer 5 5.40 1.83 2.49 0.003 0.79
Dealer 6 5.40 1.86 2.50 -0.001 0.83
Dealer 7 5.40 1.86 2.60 -0.019 0.86
We observe that the standard deviations of qT are relatively larger when compared with the
corresponding values of |qT | in most of the cases. And in the case of seven dealers, the standard
deviations of the profits are relatively large compared with the corresponding profits as well.
When the number dealers increases, we observe that profit decreases but the average spread
increases. Continuous markets are characterized by the bid and ask prices at which trades can
take place. The bid-ask spread reflects the difference between what active buyers must pay and
what active sellers receive. It is an indicator of the cost of trading and the illiquidity of a market.
We can see from the results that, when more and more agents enter into a competitive market,
on one hand, competition becomes intense, which reduces the profit that each agent can obtain
from the stock market. On the other hand, the liquidity of the stock enhances which provides
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good supplies to the traders.
5.3 Sensitivity Study of γ
We now consider the effects of varying the parameter, γ. Suppose the number of dealers in
the competitive market is fixed and that all dealers’ initial states are the same, except the risk
aversion parameter. We can see from Tables 5 & 6 and Figures 5 & 6 that risky dealers take
larger positions than risk-averse ones. They have smaller values of average spreads and larger
profits, but also suffer from larger variances of profits and final inventories qT , which lead to
higher levels of uncertainty.
Table 5: 1000 simulations of two dealers with γ1 = 0.01, γ2 = 1 and β1 = β2 = 0.5.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1 2.01 23.97 7.44 0.07 4.30
Dealer 2 3.39 17.98 4.25 -0.074 1.61
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Figure 5: γ1 = 0.01, γ2 = 1 and β1 = β2 = 0.5
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Table 6: 1000 simulations of three dealers with γ1 = 0.01, γ2 = 0.1, γ3 = 1 and β1 = β2 = β3 =
1/3.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT ).
Dealer 1 2.77 14.36 6.26 -0.09 3.43
Dealer 2 2.79 14.21 5.68 -0.01 2.70
Dealer 3 3.74 10.99 3.74 0.08 1.47
−10 0 10 20 30 40 50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
 
 
dealer−1 profit
dealer−2 profit
dealer−3 profit
Figure 6: γ1 = 0.01, γ2 = 0.1, γ3 = 1 and β1 = β2 = β3 = 1/3
5.4 Sensitivity Study of Initial Inventory Positions
We also consider the effects of varying inventories on the performance of the dealers. For
simplicity, we consider the two-dealer case.
Table 7: 1000 simulations of two dealers with γ1 = γ2 = 0.1, β1 = β2 = 0.5, q1 = 10 and q2 = 1.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1 2.11 14.85 19.59 0.19 2.94
Dealer 2 2.11 30.24 6.34 -0.13 3.00
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Figure 7: γ1 = γ2 = 0.1, β1 = β2 = 0.5, q1 = 10 and q2 = 1.
Table 8: 1000 simulations of two dealers with γ1 = γ2 = 0.1, β1 = β2 = 0.5, q1 = 50 and q2 = 0.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1 2.11 -391.98 84.14 2.09 2.99
Dealer 2 2.11 37.55 12.45 -1.98 2.91
Table 9: 1000 simulations of two dealers with γ1 = γ2 = 0.01, β1 = β2 = 0.5, q1 = 50 and
q2 = 0.
Agent Average Spread Profit Std (Profit) qT Std (qT )
Dealer 1 2.01 13.11 40.42 25.31 4.74
Dealer 2 2.01 32.69 16.18 -7.12 4.57
Setting all the parameters identical, and we assume that dealers differ only in their initial
inventory positions. From Tables 7 & 8 and Figure 7, one can see that with a larger initial
position, Dealer 1 in both examples gain smaller amounts of profits. When the initial position
is significantly large (Table 8), Dealer 1 obtains a negative profit as one may prefer a less risky
position with a negative profit than a risky position with a positive cash flow. From Table 9, one
can see that when lowering the risk aversion of Dealer 1, his final profit will increase accordingly.
We refer interested readers on the analysis of the effects of initial inventories to the paper by
Ho and Stoll (1980) [12].
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6 Conclusions
The field of market micro-structure encompasses two general types of models, i.e., inventory
models and information models. In this paper, we focus on the effect of inventory and extend
Avellanede-Stoikov’s optimal price strategy for a monopolistic dealer to that for multiple dealers
in a competitive market. We derive the approximate optimal bid and ask prices for each dealer
when the dealers are informed the severity of the competition. We also analyze the effect of
various parameters in our model on the bid-ask quotes and profits of the dealers in a competitive
market. For future research, one may take into account the presence of additional market factors
such as order handling costs, asymmetric information and inter-dealer trading in the model.
In this paper, the mid-price of the stock is assumed to follow Eq. (1). In our future study,
we shall consider a more general volatility model, for example, the Heston stochastic volatility
model [16, 17, 18]. We shall assume the mid-price follows the following stochastic differential
equations: 

dSu =
√
vudWu
dvu = θ(α− vu)du+ ξ√vudBu
dWu · dBu = ρdu
(66)
where θ, α and ξ are positive constants and the volatility, σu =
√
vu, is related to the level of
stock price via the third equation in Eq. (66) and ρ.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A.
Proof: Consider first the arrival rate of market order. When N = 1,
λa = λa(δa) = Ae−kδ
a
.
By condition (i), when N = 2
λa = λa(δa1 , δ
a
2 ) = f(δ
a
1)
β1f(δa2)
β2
where (β1 + β2 = 1); when δ
a
1 = δ
a
2 = δ
a, this is equivalent to the case when N = 1, that is
f(δa)β1f(δa)β2 = λa(δa, δa) = λa(δa) = Ae−kδ
a
Consequently
f(δa) = Ae−kδ
a
and λa = λa(δa1 , δ
a
2 ) = Ae
−k(β1δa1+β2δ
a
2
).
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By Condition (i), for any N ,
λa = λa(δa1 , · · · , δan) = f(δa1)β1 · · · f(δaN )βN
where β1 + · · ·+ βN = 1. When δa1 = · · · = δaN = δa then this situation is equivalent to the case
when N = 1, i.e.,
λa(δa, · · · , δa) = f(δa)β1 · · · f(δa)βn = λa(δa) = Ae−kδa
and f(δa) = Ae−kδ
a
. Consequently, we gave
λa = λa(δa1 , . . . , δ
a
N ) = Ae
−k(β1δa1+···+βNδ
a
N ).
To calculate the arrival rate of buy and sell orders that will reach the dealer, we need the
following information:
(i) the overall frequency of market orders;
(ii) the distribution of market orders’ size;
(iii) the temporary impact of a large market order.
From above, we are given one of the estimation of market orders’ frequency. For the other
conditions, from a lot of studies, see for instance [7, 9, 19], we have some statistical properties
of the limit order book, such as, the distribution of the size of market orders Q obeys a power
law:
fQ(x) ∝ x−1−α
and the market impact follows a “log law” [2], i.e., ∆p ∝ ln(Q) or
∆p =
1
Ki
ln(Q).
Here we recall that ∆p = pQ − s where pQ is the price of the highest limit order executed in
the trade and s is stock mid-price. Aggregating the information of limit order book’s statistical
properties, we have
λai (δ
a
i ) = λ
a · P (∆p > δai )
= λa · P (ln(Q) > Kiδai )
= λa · p(Q > exp(Kiδai ))
and
p(Q > exp(Kiδ
a
i )) ∝
∫ ∞
exp (Kiδai )
x−1−αdx.
We have, for some constant A,
λai (δ
a
i ) = A exp(−k(β1δa1 + · · ·+ βNδaN )) · exp(−(1−
1
N
)βiδ
a
i ).
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7.2 Appendix B
Proof: We note that there is no trading in the period (tn, T ),
E
[
exp(−γi
∫ T
tn
(δi,au dN
i,a
u + δ
i,b
u dN
i,b
u ))
∣∣∣Fn−1
]
= 1.
Thus the expected exponential utility of Dealer i’s ultimate wealth equals
E
[− exp(−γi(XiT + qiTST ))|Fn−1]
= −
{
λi,an−1∆tn−1 exp(−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1 + δi,an−1)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1−1)
2(T−tn−1)
2
)
λi,bn−1∆tn−1 exp(−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1 + δi,bn−1)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1+1)
2(T−tn−1)
2
)
[
1− λi,an−1∆tn−1 − λi,bn−1∆tn−1
]
exp(−γi(xin−1 + qin−1sn−1)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−1)
2(T−tn−1)
2
)}
.
By considering the first-order optimality conditions, we can obtain the optimal bid and ask
quotes as follows:

δi,bn−1 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−1)
2
(2qin−1 + 1)
δi,an−1 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−1)
2
(−2qin−1 + 1).
(67)
Substituting the optimal bid and ask quotes into the expected utility function, one can get the
utility for Dealer i.
7.3 Appendix C
Proof: We apply the principle of Dynamic Programming (DP) to Dealer i’s utility function,
and obtain
V i
(
sn−2, γi, x
i
n−2, q
i
n−2, γj , q
j
n−2(j 6= i), tn−2
)
= max
δ
i,a
n−2,δ
i,b
n−2,δ
i,a
n−1,δ
i,b
n−1
E
[
− exp(−γi(XiT + qiTST ))
∣∣∣Fn−2]
= max
δ
i,a
n−2,δ
i,b
n−2,δ
i,a
n−1,δ
i,b
n−1
E
[
E[− exp(−γi(XiT + qiTST ))|Fn−1]
∣∣∣Fn−2]
= max
δ
i,a
n−2,δ
i,b
n−2
− exp(−γi(xin−2 + qin−2sn−2))
{
λi,an−2∆tn−2
(
exp(−γiδi,an−2) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2−1)
2∆tn−2
2
)
gin−1(q
i
n−2 − 1, tn−1)
)
+
λi,bn−2∆tn−2
(
exp(−γiδi,bn−2) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2+1)
2∆tn−2
2
)
gin−1(q
i
n−2 + 1, tn−1)
)
+[
1− λi,an−2∆tn−2 − λi,bn−2∆tn−2
] (
exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2)
2∆tn−2
2
)
gin−1(q
i
n−2, tn−1)
)}
= max
δ
i,a
n−2,δ
i,b
n−2
− exp(−γi(xin−2 + qin−2sn−2)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2)
2(T − tn−2)
2
)
hin−1
{
λi,an−2∆tn−2 exp(−γiδi,an−2) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(−2qin−2+1)(T−tn−2)
2
)
+
λi,bn−2∆tn−2 exp(−γiδi,bn−2) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(−2qin−2+1)(T−tn−2)
2
)
+ 1− λi,an−2∆tn−2 − λi,bn−2∆tn−2
}
.
(68)
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By considering the first order optimality conditions, we obtain Dealer i’s optimal ask quote as
follows:
δi,an−2 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−2)
2
(−2qin−2 + 1). (69)
Similarly, we can give his bid quote
δi,bn−2 =
1
γi
ln
(
1 +
γi
(k + 1− 1
N
)βi
)
+
γiσ
2(T − tn−2)
2
(2qin−2 + 1). (70)
Substituting the optimal bid and ask quotes into the utility function, one can obtain Dealer
i’s utility function:
V i
(
sn−2, γi, x
i
n−2q
i
n−2, γj , q
j
n−2(j 6= i), tn−2
)
= − exp(−γi(xin−2 + qin−2sn−2)) exp
(
γ2i σ
2(qin−2)
2(T − tn−2)
2
)
[
1− γi∆tn−2
(k+1− 1
N
)βi
(
λi,an−2 + λ
i,b
n−2
)]
hin−1.
(71)
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